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COGNITION AND POLITENESS 
Abstract: Scientists working in the areas of gestalt psychology and 
cognitive semantics rely on the fact that the physical experience of the 
surrounding world is a determining factor in cognition and in the 
establishment of conceptual systems. It has been found that these systems 
strongly bear upon human communication in general. 
The paper seeks an answer to the question: why do speakers often use 
declaratives instead of interrogatives to ask questions? 
The phenomenon is assumed to be related to politeness, which is 
manifested by the speaker's lexico-grammatical choice. It is proposed that in 
discourse the upshot of such unstraightforwardness is politeness, and it is 
likely to spring out of a process, which is a kind of metaphorization in the 
philosophical sense. This process involves various metaphors both on the 
side of production and interpretation, such as MORE IS MORE, or 
DISTANCE IS LACK OF STRENGTH, which affiliate with two underlying 
concepts: 'Knowledge is Mental Space' and 'Cognition is a Tour'. 
By virtue of these basic concepts politeness is a reflection of physical 
reality. 
1. Experience and Meaning 
The human conceptual system contains several basic concepts. Some of 
these emerge directly from our physical experiences such as spatial 
orientation (eg. UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, NEAR-FAR, FRONT-BACK), others 
are ontological concepts (eg. ENTITY, SUBSTANCE, CONTAINER, 
PERSON), and we also encounter with some structured experiences and 
activities (eg. EATING, MOVING, TRANSFERRING OBJECTS FROM 
PLACE TO PLACE) in our life. 
Cognitive linguistics is based on an approach to language in which 
meaning is understood to arise from the physical experience of the 
surrounding world. This gives rise to a novel interpretation of metaphor, 
which is considered inherent to understanding abstract concepts. The 
richness and complexity of the metaphorical systems of the English language 
has been discussed in a huge literature (see Lakoff and Johnson (1980), 
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Reddy (1979), Sweetser (1987), Lakoff (1985), Langacker (1986), Dirven 
(1985), Radden (1985), Johnson (1987), inter alia). 
Lakoff (1985) assumes that besides these the human mind also contains 
metaphorical concepts. He defines them as follows: 
"Metaphorical concepts are those which are understood and 
structured not merely on their own terms, but rather in terms of 
other concepts. This involves conceptualizing one kind of object or 
experience in terms of a different kind of object or experience" 
(ibid.:58). 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) classify metaphors into three types (see also 
Lakoff, 1985): 
orientational metaphors: 
More Is Up, Control Is Up, Good Is Up, Rational Is Up, 
ontological metaphors: 
Ideas Are Entities and Words Are Containers, The Mind Is a 
Container, The Mind Is a Machine, The Mind Is a Brittle Object, 
Vitality Is a Substance, 
and structural metaphors such as 
Understanding Is Seeing, Life Is a Gambling Game. 
Whether or not it is admitted many scientific communication theories 
account for conceptual metaphors and folk theories such as 
'Communication Is Sending', 'The Mind Is a Container', 'Ideas 
Are Objects', 'Linguistic Expressions Are Containers'. 
These are parts of the pervasive folk theory which Reddy (1979) calls the 
CONDUIT metaphor. Theories that are based on the view that language is a 
code and communication is sending messages in that code from a speaker to 
a hearer make use of the CONDUIT metaphor. Reddy (ibid.) provides more 
than a hundred types of linguistic expressions in English that are 
systematically organized by the conduit metaphor. The following are but a 
few of his examples: 
it's hard to put my ideas into words, his words don't carry much 
conviction, your words seem hollow, let me try to get across what I 
have in mind, who gave you that idea? 
Lakoff (1985) notes that although the CONDUIT metaphor seems 
natural, because it fits very well certain types of situations which are taken 
by many communication theorists as being prototypical - e.g. at the checkout 
counter at the local supermarket - in most significant cases the CONDUIT 
metaphor is inadequate to a greater or lesser extent. He proposes that 
"In fact, what makes such cases of communication important is the 
very failure of the CONDUIT metaphor. Communication matters 
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most where the elements that make the CONDUIT metaphor fit 
well are not present - that is, where we do not share the same 
cultural assumptions, relevant knowledge, and relevant experience, 
and especially where our conceptual metaphors and folk theories 
differ. In such cases communication requires special skill; it 
becomes a matter of imaginative and poetic skill on the part of both 
participants, not just the speaker" (1985:71). 
In the cognitive-experientialist view cognition involves some basic 
schemata which are inherent part of our thinking (cf. Neisser 1976). 
Lakoff s (1987) and Johnson's (1987) work is based on the conception 
that meanings derive from our bodily experience of the surrounding world 
and our bodily interaction with the environment. They argue that the child's 
early sensorimotor experience in the spatial world determine our thinking, 
and that abstract thoughts are metaphorically grounded in our preconceptual 
kinesthetic image schemas. They notice that the basic schemas like 'the 
Container schema', 'the Link schema', 'the Up-down schema' and 'the Path 
schema' are mapped onto our abstract modes of thought, and thus they are 
reflected in the language. 
The discovery that the physical world and our experiences of it are 
present in the language via imagination and metaphorical projection led 
Johnson to "put the Body back into the Mind" (cf. Johnson (1987)). 
Johnson (ibid.) suggests that image schemata are central to meaning 
structure, and that they influence the ways in which we can make sense of 
things and reason about them. He points out that 
"Metaphorically, we understand the process of reasoning as a form 
of motion along a path - propositions are the locations (or bounded 
areas) that we start out from, proceed through and wind up at. 
Holding a proposition is understood metaphorically as being 
located at that point (or in that area)" (1987:38). 
To illustrate how the above described general metaphorical system is 
reflected in the English language about reasoning Johnson (ibid.) provides 
the following examples: 
Let us start out from the proposition that Hamlet feared his father. 
You can't move to that conclusion form where you are now. 
From here I'll proceed to show that humans are slaves of their 
passions. 
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Once you reach that point in the argument, you've got to go on to 
the conclusion. 
The next step is to demonstrate that monkeys can make tools. 
He got off the track of the argument. 
That assumption will lead you astray. 
In what follows I assume that cognition is a complex process in which 
two major domains of human experience play a determining role: the domain 
of 'KNOWING' and the domain of 'NOT KNOWING'. These are 
psychological states of mind alternating in the process of cognition, 
intertwining, and verbal communication presupposes the presence of both. 
Cognition is a tour across these domains. 
2. Conceptual Metaphors of Cognition 
In the following I propose some elaboration of Lakoff and Johnson's 
(1980) ontological metaphor: 'The Mind Is a Container'. 
My suggestion is that psychological and cognitive states, as products of 
the mind, just like ideas, are also experienced as a substance. Some states 
of mind are experienced as a pervading material medium into which humans 
can descend in the same way as they can plunge into a pool of water. The 
English language reflects this metaphorical projection in phrases expressing 
the shift into certain psychological states such as: 
plunge into despair, plunge into daydreaming. 
One can also plunge into one's thoughts, an obvious evidence that cognitive 
processes are experienced in a similar way. 
Other phrases imply that "States of Mind Are Territories": 
I don't want to intrude on your grief. 
Don't intrude into her solitude. 
Part of the concept of 'Knowledge' seems to be the metaphor 
'Knowledge Is Mental Space'. States of consciousness like 'KNOWING' 
and 'NOT KNOWING' are territories, i.e. domains of the mind, which is 
reflected by phrases such as 
live in ignorance, be / live in a fool's paradise, or be in the 
belief that..., advance in scientific knowledge. 
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In my interpretation the domains of 'KNOWING', and 'NOT 
KNOWING' intersect to form a third domain, that of 'BELIEVING'. To 
believe is neither to know nor not to know; it is to make a supposition, a 
hypothesis. In discourse a supposition can be either confirmed as true, or 
denied as not true, so the speaker expressing his hypothesis either gets into 
the domain of 'KNOWING' or slips over into the domain of 'NOT 
KNOWING'. 
In figure a below I propose a schema of how the cognitive domains of the 
mind impart the three different kinds of domains: 
It would be oversimplification of the matter, however, to maintain that 
the borderlines between the domains are as distinct as shown in Figure 1, 
and that their arrangement can be identified in such an explicit way. The 
schema is meant only to imply that in the process of cognition there is a 
possibility of transition from one domain into another one. The usual 
direction of the tour is from 'NOT KNOWING' to 'KNOWING' or from 
'BELIEVING' to 'KNOWING', but it can also de diverse. 
In the mind the process of learning or understanding is associated with 
movement: 
one can get/come to know things, come to the understanding 
/conclusion that..., get into the way of things, make great strides in 
the domain of 'KNOWING' or run into problems/difficulties in the 
domain of 'NOT KNOWING', and perhaps go round in circles, 
which does not lead anywhere, whereas one who does not want to 
take such 'trips' may live in a cuckoo land, i.e. be ignorant of 
reality. 
The experience of movement in the process of cognition gives ground for 
the metaphor: 'Cognition is a Tour'. 
Figure A 
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Iri the course of discourse the participants often are in different 
'domains', i.e. they are at different stages of cognition, and often, their 
purpose is to get into one and the same domain of knowing or believing, i.e. 
to come to some understanding or agreement. The process is a very delicate 
one, and it seems to involve several concepts about the physical world and 
reality. 
One way of getting into the partner's domain is by asking questions. 
3. The Force Dynamics of Questions 
While tracing how image schemata provide the basis for meaning 
relations and for inferential patterns in our reasoning Johnson (1987) argues 
for the overwhelming experience of force and balance to be reflected in the 
realm of speech acts, as some metaphorical extensions of coherent basic 
level bodily experiences of systemic processes and states: 
"...there are patterns of force at work in the structure of the 
speech act itself. So, besides physiscal force, social force, and 
epistemic force, there is a level of speech act force 
(illocutionary force ) dynamics. My central claim,...,is that the 
relevant forces at this last level are also based on force gestalts 
metaphorically elaborated" (1987:58). 
I assume that social interactions such as conversations can also be 
described in terms of image schemata and metaphorical projection. Besides 
Lakoff and Johnson's above mentioned CONTAINER schema, the 
'Knowledge is Mental Space' and 'Cognition is a Tour' metaphors seem 
to be at work in the process of discourse, which involves several other 
experiential patterns. 
In the following I will use Johnson's (1987) schemata modified to my 
interpretation. 
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In his discussion of schematic configurations Johnson (1987:2) 
emphasizes the overwhelming experience of physical FORCE and 
BALANCE and sets up a COMPULSION SCHEMA as follows: 
FORCE 
Figure B 
In cognitive semantics the concept of force dynamics has played a major 
role in the interpretation of CAUSATION and TRANSITIVITY as well as in 
a new explanation of the senses of modal verbs (cf. Radden, 1991). 
Sweetser (1990:49-75) suggests that the notions of modality are 
metaphorical extensions from the force-dynamic image schemas of the folk-
physical world. Must denotes a compelling force which moves a subject 
toward an act. 
Johnson (1987:51-2) also makes notes about the sociophysical force of 
must. 
The compelling force, which is implied by the auxiliary must, Johnson 
argues, is similar to the sense of physical force, illustrated by the compulsion 
schema in Figure 2 above. 
In a similar way, the concept of permission is understood as the removal 
of the potential barrier to one's action, which is represented by Johnson's 
(1987: 47) schema of REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT: 
My claim is that in discourse an act of demanding, i.e. commanding or 
asking a question (see Halliday, 1985:68) is basically a compellation, and as 
F 
Figure C 
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such it works as an external force coming from the speaker and operating on 
the addressee. When asking a question, the speaker, the source of the 
compellation, is in the domain of 'NOT KNOWING', whereas the addressee 
is supposed to be in the domain of 'KNOWING'. The speaker's aim is to get 
into the domain of 'KNOWING', which can be achieved by the removal of a 
'blockage', i.e. the lack of knowledge. The removal of the blockage is to be 
carried out by the addressee. The diagram below stands here to illustrate this 
process schematically: 
The process can be interpreted as a metaphorical tour in which the 
participants co-operate in getting from one cognitive domain into another; 
the direction usually being from 'NOT KNOWING' or 'BELIEVING' to 
'KNOWING' through the domains of shared experience. 
A question is a blockage in the communication, which can be embodied 
in a linguistic sign, a word (e.g. a question word), or it can be 'a blockage' of 
a more abstract kind, a general sense expressed via the whole utterance. In 
the discourse the blockage is supposed to be moved by the addressee so that 
the participants end up in the same domain, the addressee's domain. 
4. Question Function Realized by Declarative Form 
Questions - both interrogative or non-interrogative - are of various forms, 
and the choices made by the speaker in terms of form are determined by 
various factors. One of these may be the speaker's motivation for politeness. 
My observation is, that in radio interviews or in talk shows, i.e., the 
interviewer or the leader of the programme often uses non-interrogative 
SPEAKER'S ADDRESSE'S 
DOMAIN 
• * 
DOMAIN 
Figure D 
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utterances to elicit a reply while taking the risk of being misunderstood or 
getting an unsatisfactory reply. It seems sensible to think that the reason for 
such a choice on the part of the interviewer may not only be to avoid the 
monotony of the default question-answer pattern of such encounters, but also 
to show compromise in terms of how much the addresse is willing to 
contribute, i.e. to be less intrusive, in other words, to be polite. 
The extracts provided below are examples of a variety of the techiques a 
speaker can use to elicit a reply from his partner. The addressees' responses 
to the declarative elicitations are here to show that the declaratives of the 
first speaker are not necessarily interpreted as a hypothetical statement 
requiring affirmation, but often they are interpreted similarly to 
interrogatives. 
1. A: So it's the hours of your time, which is a crutial 
matter. 
B: That's right. We are creatures of the hour, creatures of time. We are a 
little bit like parking meters, really. The clock continues to click. 
The second speaker could have given the simplest reply to the elicitation 
by saying 'Yes ' , but he came up with a longer response instead. His 
explanation implies that he thought he was expected not only to confirm the 
first speaker's hypothetical statement, but also to provide the reasons for it. 
In extract 2. a simple confirmation - Wo' - would not have safisfied the 
interviewer: 
2. A: / don't imagine that you just write straight on the 
page. 
B: No. The whole art of easy writing , of course, is to make it look as if it 
were dashed off, as if it were knocked off. But you can write a 
sentence five times and then it reads as if it's been just knocked off. 
The interviewee interpreted the speaker's declarative as " How does good 
writing come about?" or "So what do you do?". 
The following sections seek an answer to the question how politeness 
comes about in the case of non-interrogative questions. 
93 
5. Cognitive Semantic Aspects of Politeness 
For the past twenty-five years several phenomena in language use have 
been referred to as a matter of politeness, and to approach it from the other 
end: politeness has been investigated from many different aspects. 
In philosophical linguistics indirect speech acts have been accounted for 
as acts motiveted by politeness (Searle, 1975:74). Sociolinguists have 
investigated various aspects of the phenomenon. Goffman puts focus on the 
ritual character of politeness (see Goffman, 1967, 1971, 1981 e.g.). Gordon 
D. and Lakoff, G. (1971), or Brown and Levinson, (1978) consider 
politeness as strategic avoidance of conflicts, of which conventional 
indirectness in social encounters is a major strategy. 
To reach their goals the participants use various tactics in the 'game'. The 
linguistic forms they choose can be definite and straightforward, as in the 
case of a question interrogative in form: 
3. What problems did you have yesterday coming back 
into the country? 
Quite often, however, the initiating utterance is not interrogative, yet it 
shows the speaker's aim to elicit a response: 
4. As far as I know you had some problems yesterday 
coming back into the country. 
5.1 gather you've just been made redundant. 
My assumption is that hypothetical statements eliciting a reply - such as 
l.,2., 4. and 5. above - are a politeness phenomenon. The question arises: 
what is it that makes them so tactful, i.e. how does politeness come about in 
these utterances? 
In this section I will make an attempt to explore some cognitive aspects 
of politeness by using relevant concepts and theories. 
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To get into the domain of the addressee is a kind of intrusion. Goffman's 
(1967) notion of 'face' implies this concept of territoriality, which he points 
out in his 'Replies and Responses' (1981:37) as follows: 
"To ask an improperly personal question can be equivalent 
to making an unwanted visit; both constitute invasions of 
territoriality". 
Grice's principles of co-operative behaviour (see Grice,1975) can be 
either observed or floated. However, floating the maxims of MANNER (viz. 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression, 2. Avoid ambiguity, 3. Be brief, 4. Be 
orderly ), is often to do with another principle: "Be polite". 
Conversationalists sometimes follow this principle at the cost of the maxims 
"Be br ief , and "Avoid ambiguity". 
Brown and Levinson (1987) offer a detailed discussion of the politeness 
principles, which are realized in various strategies of social encounters. 
Using Goffman's (1967) term 'face' they classify their linguistic forms into 
'face saving' and 'face threatening' acts, and then cross-classify them into 
'bald on record' and 'off record' types. Their notion of 'face' also ties up 
with notions of being embarrassed or humiliated, or 'losing face'. As they 
put it: 
"Thus face is something that is emotionally invested, and that can 
be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended 
to in interaction. In general, people cooperate (and assume each 
other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such 
cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face" 
(1987:61). 
Requests are considered face threatening acts in linguistic literature. 
Using an imperative form is a "bald-on-record strategy" in Brown and 
Levinson's framework, and as such it is a face-threatening act (FTA) (cf. 
ibid.:95). 
My view is that questions are also FTA's in the broad sense. A question 
represents a problem, and a problem is a compulsion of a psychological 
kind, consequently, any elicitation for a reply is a face threatening act. To 
maintain and enhance their partners' face speakers can opt out for less 
'threatening' linguistic realizations by choosing the declarative form instead 
of the interrogative. 
For an explanation why questions can be considered FTA's let us turn to 
a cognition theory again. Johnson's (1987) proposal about the force 
dynamics of speech acts, viz. the "illocutionary force", which determines 
whether the hearer will interpret the utterance as a question, assertion, 
command, or some other type of illocutionary act provides a sensible starting 
point: 
"...statements are typically presented by speakers to force the 
hearers to add some belief to their belief system. Questions force 
the hearer to supply a certain relevant content to fill a gap in some 
informational structure. Directives exert force to compel the hearer 
to realize some state of affairs. And performatives (Searle's 
"declaratives") constitute forceful changes of the state of the 
world" (1987:59). 
Although all utterances act upon the hearer with a particular force some 
force is stonger than another. Demanding acts, i.e. commands and questions, 
obviously, represent a stronger force than giving acts, i.e. 
assertions/statements. To be less forceful and intrusive, i.e. to save the 
addressee's face the speaker has the option of avoiding linguistic items that 
represent a 'problem' explicitly, and as such, demand immediate solution -
"removal of the blockage" - by using less straightforward language. Johson 
(1987:59) refers to "the force that acts on the sentence container", which 
determines the shape of the utterance, i.e. " of the speech-act container". 
I assume that in conversation the utterance form, i.e. the "sentence-
container" carries the force of the utterance in inverse ratio to 
straightforwardness. 
The realizations of demanding acts can be arranged along a scale of 
straightforwardness as follows: 
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REALIZATIONS 
Tell me if you are a decisive person. 
Are you a decisive person? 
You are a decisive person, aren 't you ? 
So you are a decisive person. 
I think you are a decisive person. 
I'm sure you are a decisive person. 
You are a decisive person. 
Figure E 
What is the reason for the principle: the less straightforward the form the 
more polite the utterance? Why are utterances at the the bottom of the 
realization list considered much less intrusive than the interrogative at the 
top? 
For the politeness feature of the interpersonal meaning of declarative 
elicitations I propose the following explanation: 
The 'default' function of a declarative is that of a statement. In 
conversation comments on statements are usually optional. When the 
speaker asks the addressee in a form which is less straightforward than an 
interrogative, he also offers a choice, which can be regarded a face saving 
act. The utterance 
6. I think you are a decisive person 
when used as an initiation leaves it to the addresse whether or not he 
wants to reply. The force of the compellation here is rather weak, as there is 
no "blockage" realized in a lexico-grammatical sign, the only barrier being 
the signal of the hypothesis: I think. 
Straightforward questions, i.e. interrogatives, on the other hand, offer no 
choice, they have a very strong compelling force, therefore they clearly are 
FTA's. The interrogatives 
7. Are you a decisive person? 
STRAIGHTFORWARDNESS 
UNSTRAIGHTFORWARDNESS 
7T 
7T 
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or 8. What are you like? 
definitely demand an answer. 
Another approach to cognition and politeness can be another 'physical' 
explanation, which implies the concept: 
MORE IS MORE. 
The larger the physical distance between two persons the less likely a 
"physical invasion" into their territories. 
The longer an utterance the more time it takes and the more abstract 
distance it implies. 
The longer the PATH the further away the PHYSICAL GOAL. If the 
goal is the addressee's mind, and the speaker's intention is to make the 
addressee react, the longer the time available for the addressee to prepare for 
the response the less the psychological compellation. By deliberately making 
the distance larger the speaker emphasizes his unwillingness to intrude on 
the addressee. 
The concept MORE IS MORE seems compatible with Johnson and 
Lakoff s conceptual metaphor: CLOSENESS IS STRENGTH OF EFFECT 
(1980:128-132), and this allows us to make a step further and the following 
plausible inference. 
DISTANCE IS LACK OF STRENGTH. This metaphor seems to underly 
not only to politeness, but also to common abstract concepts. It is probably 
such conceptual metaphors that provide basis for the meaning of several 
words and phrases used to describe human behaviour and relationships, too. 
A person who keeps the distance does not want to get involved or have 
power. Someone who is called distant is cold, emotionally detached and 
unfriendly. A stand-offish person is rather unfriendly and behaves in a 
formal or distant way to other people, whereas a close friend usually has a 
strong effect on us. 
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Summary 
The aim of this paper was to make a tentative suggestion of how 
politeness arises in those cases when the speaker uses non-interrogative 
forms to ask questions, and how this phenomenon is related to some 
cognitive semantic aspects of interpersonal communication. 
It was suggested that politeness is related to the basic concept of 
DISTANCE as a physical experience, and that the more unstraightforward 
an utterance the longer distance it implies. The longer the distance the less 
the FORCE. 
When being unstraightforward the speaker ventures his intentions not to 
be grasped exactly by the listener, yet he often takes the risk in order to 
prevent the addressee from the feeling of being stressed and forced to 
collaborate. It is very likely that it is the respect for the partner's face that 
motivates the speaker to use a declarative utterance to ask a question instead 
of a more forceful interrogative one. 
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